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ASSESSMENTS IN WASHINGTON
PHILIP A. TRAUTMAN*
The history of the development of cities and towns in Washington,
as elsewhere in the nation, is punctuated with problems relating to the
construction and financing of local improvements. The accelerating
increase of population in metropolitan areas of the state,' can be
expected to multiply these problems. It thus seems appropriate to
examine special assessment principles as an aid to counsel representing
private parties or municipalities 2
CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
The principal provision of the Washington Constitution with which
we are concerned is article 7, section 9: "The legislature may vest the
corporate authorities of cities, towns and villages with power to make
local improvements by special assessment, or by special taxation of
property benefited .... "
This provision explicitly states that the power of local bodies is
dependent upon delegation from the legislature. The nature of this
delegation, as it has been developed, will be examined in the following
section. The provision also allows delegation only to "the corporate
authorities of cities, towns and villages." It has no application to
counties or other municipal bodies,' though the legislature is not pre-
cluded from granting to other bodies the power to construct local
improvements and to pay for them by special assessments.'
Article 7, section 9, does not provide an exclusive method by which
cities and towns may defray the cost of local improvements. In 1930
the city of Chelan constructed a sewer system, by local assessments,
except for the trunk sewer and treatment plant, which were financed by
the sale of general obligation bonds. Subsequently, additions and im-
provements to the system were required, including extensions into pre-
viously unserved areas. Acting pursuant to statute, the city combined
* Professor of Law University of Washington
1 See CITIZENS ADVISORY COMI. OF THE WASH. LEGISLATrVE COMM. ON URBAN
AREA GOVERNMENT, CITY AND SUBURB-COMMUNITY OR CHAOS (1962).
2 This article will consider problems arising from the initiation of assessment pro-
ceedings and the establishment of local improvement districts. A subsequent article
will examine the problems relating to the payment and collection of assessments.
3 Bilger v. State, 63 Wash. 457, 116 Pac. 19 (1911) ; 61 OPs. ATT'Y GEN. 79 (1961).
3 Bilger v. State, 63 Wash. 457, 116 Pac. 19 (vTvv); 61 Ops. ATT'Y GEN. 79 (1961).
4 Hansen v. Hammer, 15 Wash. 315, 46 Pac. 332 (1896) ; Foster v. Commisisoners
of Cowlitz County, 100 Wash. 502, 171 Pac. 539 (1918).
[100]
ASSESSMENTS IN WASHINGTON
its water works utility and sewer system, constructed and installed
additions and improvements, and proceeded to collect service charges
for water and sewer service to pay for the improvements. Owners who
had been assessed for the original improvements in 1930 objected to
paying any part of the cost connected with the construction and instal-
lation of the additions to the original sewer system, which would serve
only new users and would be of no benefit to them. The Washington
court recognized that the owners' objection would be valid if the city
had acted pursuant to the local improvement statutes. Here, however,
the city had acted in the exercise of its police power; it was providing
sewer service to protect the health of its inhabitants and defraying the
expense by making service charges. The court specifically noted that
article 7, section 9 of the constitution does not provide the exclusive
method of defraying the cost of local improvements.5 Nevertheless, the
vast majority of local improvements are made under the authority of
article 7, section 9; it is to problems created by that provision that this
article will primarily be directed.
The constitution empowers the legislature to vest cities and towns
with power to make "local improvements." Initially, the legislature has
discretion to decide what a local improvement is.6 It has exercised this
discretion in detail, as will be noted at length later. And when this
discretion has been exercised, the court has shown little tendency to
interfere."
As general guidelines, the Washington court has set forth two essen-
tial characteristics of an improvement which may be chargeable upon
private property: (1) the improvement must be of a public nature, as
distinguished. from one purely private; and it must be of such a nature
as to justify the municipalities constructing and maintaining it by
general taxation;8 and (2) the improvement must confer a special
benefit on the property sought to be specially charged with its creation
and maintenance, over and above that benefit conferred generally upon
property within the municipality.9
Some jurisdictions have added a third characteristic, permanency,"
but the Washington court has held that this is not essential. Thus, a
GMorse v. Wise, 37 Wn2d 806, 226 P.2d 214 (1951).
6 RCW 35.43.040.
7 Smith v. Seattle, 25 Wash. 300, 65 Pac. 612 (1901).
8 Yakinma v. Snively, 140 Wash. 328, 248 Pac. 788 (1926) ; Allen v. Spokane, 108
Wash. 407, 184 Pac. 312 (1919).9 Ankeny v. Spokane, 92 Wash. 549, 159 Pac. 806 (1916).
10 See FoRanAm, LOcAL GovEmMENT LAW 458 (1949), and STASON & KAuPER,
CASES 599 (3d ed. 1959).
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statute authorizing cities to order and make assessments for construct-
ing and maintaining a street lighting system for a local improvement
district was held not to violate article 7, section 9, even though the
operation was limited to a period of ten years." In dictum, the court
suggested that a local improvement district could not be charged with
the cost of repair of a street, as contrasted with its construction, not
because of lack of permanency but because of lack of special benefit to
the abutting property over and above general benefit to the public at
Iarge.'2
The difference between general and special benefits is critical in dis-
tinguishing taxation from local assessment. While the Washington
court has at times spoken of the levy and collection of local improve-
ment assessments as being a branch of the sovereign power of taxa-
tion," a distinction between the two has been more commonly recog-
nized. This distinction is well stated in an early case:
The theory upon which general taxation proceeds is entirely distinct from
that of local assessments. General taxation is sought to be enforced
against all classes of property upon an ad valorem basis, while local
assessments are limited to real property within a given district, and are
based entirely upon the theory of special benefit by which the value of
property is enhanced in excess of the general good. General taxation is
enforced to serve the necessary purposes of government, while local
assessments are enforced to serve mere local convenience, and for the
additional benefit of private property holders. These differences make it
necessary to recognize taxation and local assessments as distinct sub-
jects .... 1-
Applying these broad concepts to a specific situation, general taxation
might be used to pay for a sewage treatment plant which would benefit
an entire municipality or metropolitan area; special assessments might
be assessed to pay for sewer lines in each district; and sewer charges
might be made for maintenance and operation of the system. 5
The necessity for distinguishing between general taxation and special
assessments becomes apparent in analyzing the application of certain
11 Ankeny v. Spokane, 92 Wash. 549, 159 Pac. 806 (1916).
121n Young v. Tacoma, 31 Wash. 153, 71 Pac. 742 (1903), it was held that an
assessment for construction of a street improvement under a city charter could not
include an assessment for future repairs. However, RCW 35.43.040 seems to allow for
creation of a local improvement district and levy of a special assessment for the repair
of streets.
13 State ex rel. Spokane v. DeGraff, 143 Wash. 326, 255 Pac. 371 (1927).
14 McMillan v. Tacoma, 26 Wash. 358, 361, 67 Pac. 68 (1901).
15 See RHYNE, MUNICIPAL LAw 714 (1957). Compare Morse v. Wise, 37 Wn2d
806, 226 P.2d 214 (1951).
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constitutional limitations and restraints upon municipal power. The
second sentence of article 7, section 9, provides, "For all corporate
purposes, all municipal corporations may be vested with authority to
assess and collect taxes and such taxes shall be uniform in respect to
persons and property within the jurisdiction of the body levying the
same." The requirement of uniformity of taxes as to property applies
only to general taxation for corporate purposes;"8 it does not restrict
assessments for local improvements according to local benefits, which
of course may vary from one tract or lot to another." Likewise, the
fact that multiple assessments are made upon the same property does
not violate any principle against double taxation, so long as special
benefit results from each improvement.'
A comparable problem is posed by article 11, section 12 of the Wash-
ington Constitution which provides, "The legislature shall have no
power to impose taxes upon counties, cities, towns or other municipal
corporations, or upon the inhabitants or property thereof, for county,
city, town or other municipal purposes, but may, by general laws, vest
in the corporate authorities thereof, the power to assess and collect taxes
for such purposes." This provision prohibits the legislature from levy-
ing, or authorizing agencies other than municipal corporations to levy,
general taxes for municipal corporation purposes." However, it does
not prohibit the legislature from authorizing some agency of the govern-
ment other than the municipality to levy a special assessment upon land
in a municipality according to benefits resulting to that land."0
The necessity for distinguishing between general taxes and special
assessments is further illustrated by the so-called forty-mill limitation
provision. The seventeenth amendment to the Washington Constitution
provides, 11... the aggregate of all tax levies upon real and personal
property by the state and all taxing districts now existing or hereafter
created, shall not in any year exceed forty mills on the dollar of assessed
valuation, which assessed valuation shall be fifty per centum of the true
and fair value of such property in money...." This provision limits
only the amount of general ad valorem taxes to be levied, and has no
application to local assessments against property specifically benefited
by an improvement.2'
16 See Trautman, Legislative Control of Municipal Corporations in Washington,
38 WAsr. L. REv. 743, 755-57 (1963).
17 Smith v. Seattle, 25 Wash. 300, 65 Pac. 612 (1901).
Is In re Aurora Ave., 180 Wash. 523, 41 P2d 143 (1935).
10 See discussion in Trautman, supra note 16, at 749-55.
20 State ex rel. Conner v. Superior Court, 81 Wash. 480, 143 Pac. 112 (1914).21State ex. rel. Frese v. Normandy Park, 64 Wnt2d 423, 393 P.2d 207 (1964).
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A comparable limitation is placed upon municipal indebtedness by
the twenty-seventh amendment to the Washington Constitution. That
amendment broadly limits municipal indebtedness to an amount not
exceeding one and one-half per cent of the taxable property within
municipal boundaries. It was early established that an indebtedness to
be paid out of a special fund derived from special assessments does not
fall within this constitutional debt limitation.22 The twenty-seventh
amendment also provides that a city or town, with the assent of three-
fifths of its voters, may become indebted to a larger amount, not ex-
ceeding an additional five per cent in order to supply the city or town
with water, light, and sewers, when the works are owned and controlled
by the municipality. In Smith v. Seattle,3 it was ingeniously argued
that this provision prohibited municipal corporatons from financng such
improvements other than by payments out of the general fund, and
limited legislative power to vest cities and towns with authority to
finance such improvements by special assessments. The court held,
however, that this provision was limited only to those instances in
which a city might construct an improvement and pay for it out of the
general fund, for example, laying a main water line. In those instances
in which the city elects to provide water, light, and sewers by special
assessment, this provision has no effect.
Just as constitutional limits upon municipal taxes and debts have no
application to special assessments, constitutional limitations upon
exercise of the power of eminent domain likewise have no direct bearing
upon special assessments. The power of eminent domain and the power
to levy special assessments are sometimes exercised together. For
example, a city might condemn certain land to be used as a street and
levy special assessments upon abutting property benefited by the street.
Part of an owner's land might be condemned for the laying of water
mains and another part assessed for the special benefits received. It is
essential to distinguish the two powers. For example, the ninth amend-
ment to the Washington Constitution provides for a jury trial to deter-
mine the amount of compensation owing for a taking by eminent
domain; no such provision is made for determination of the amount of
benefits received from local improvements." The more general jury
22 Baker v. Seattle, 2 Wash. 576, 27 Pac. 462 (1891). However, if a city assumes
primary liability for such indebtedness out of its general funds, the constitutional debt
limit must not be exceeded. Austin v. Seattle, 2 Wash. 667, 27 Pac. 557 (1891).
23 25 Wash. 300, 65 Pac. 612 (1901).
24 Commissioners Commercial Waterway Dist. No. 2 v. Seattle Factory Sites Co.,
76 Wash. 181, 135 Pac. 1042 (1913).
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trial provision in article 1, section 21 of the Washington Constitution,
"The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate," relates only to issues
which were triable by jury at common law or triable by jury by statute
when the constitution was adopted." Since no right to a jury trial
in special assessment proceedings was available at common law, nor
required by statute when the constitution was adopted, no right to a
jury trial in special assessment proceedings is guaranteed by article 1,
section 21.26 Statutes provide for assessment by city councils and com-
missioners, subject to review by the courts without a jury. It is to these
statutes that our attention will now be directed.
GENERAL STATUTORY AUTHORITY
It is commonplace that municipal corporations possess only those
powers expressly enumerated by statute, those necessarily or fairly
implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted, and those essen-
tial to the declared objects and purposes of the municipal corporation.28
It is generally agreed that municipal corporations have no inherent
power to levy special assessments. Likewise, the power is not implied
from a general power to levy taxes or to make improvements." The
power to levy special assessments must be expressly conferred by
statutes or charters. Such is the case in Washington.
As previously discussed, the source of the power of cities and towns
to levy special assessments is article 7, section 9. The Washington Con-
stitution does not grant this power directly to cities and towns, but
authorizes the legislature to do so; " thus the power of a municipality
to levy special assessments depends upon statutory enactment; it does
not exist unless a valid statute confers it."' The only constitutional
limitation upon the power of a city to levy a special assessment is that
the assessment shall not exceed the benefit, but any additional limita-
tions or qualifications placed upon the city's powers by the legislature
25 For a general discussion of jury trial rights, see Trautman, Right to Jury Trial
in Washington--Present & Future, 34 WASH. L. REv., 401 (1959).
2OIn re Jackson St, 62 Wash. 432, 113 Pac. 1112 (1911).
2 7 The court's function is one of review. Levying assessments is deemed a legisla-
tive function under the separation of powers doctrine. Further, directly empowering
courts to levy assessments might violate article 7, section 9 of the Washington Consti-
tution, which empowers the legislature to vest in cities the authority to levy assess-
ments. In re Westlake Ave., 40 Wash. 144, 82 Pac. 279 (1905) ; State ex rel. Matson
v. Superior Court, 42 Wash. 491, 85 Pac. 264 (1906).
28 See discussion in Trautman, supra note 16 at 772-75.
20 See 2 ANTrrEAu, MuNIciPAL CoaroATxoN LAW 289-90 (1964).
30 The same is true of the general power of taxation. State ex. rel. School Dist. v.
Clark County, 177 Wash. 314, 31 P.2d 897 (1934) ; Great No. Ry. v. Stevens County,
108 Wash. 238, 183 Pac. 65 (1919).8 1 Northern Pac. Ry. v. Seattle, 46 Wash. 674, 91 Pac. 244 (1907).
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must be complied with. Thus if no provision is made for assessment to
pay interest on bonds issued to finance an improvement, no such assess-
ment can be made."2 If assessments are limited by statute to a certain
percentage of the assessed valuation of municipal property as shown on
the tax rolls, this limitation must be complied with.33 If statutes pre-
scribe certain procedural steps to be followed in the levying of assess-
ments, these steps must be followed.
Of course, as noted above, article 7, section 9, does not provide the
exclusive method of defraying the cost of local improvements. Such
local improvements as may be necessary to promote health and sanita-
tion may be authorized by the legislature in the exercise of its police
power, and the cost of these improvements need not be defrayed by
local assessments.34 Also, a city might initiate an improvement under
a special assessment plan in accordance with the statutes enacted pur-
suant to article 7, section 9, abandon the plan and pay for the improve-
ment with other public funds. In Clise v. Seattle,"5 after a contract had
been let and work undertaken for a street improvement, it became
apparent that a sum sufficient to pay the contractor might not be raised
by a local improvement assessment. The contractor was released from
his contract, the work was abandoned, an assessment roll was prepared
to cover the completed work, and a special assessment was levied to
liquidate the obligation owing to the contractor. The city then appro-
priated sums from the general fund to complete the improvement. This
action was sanctioned by the court.3 " In most cases, however, the
statutes relating to special assessments are followed through to com-
pletion in constructing local improvements; it is to these statutes that
we shall now turn.
Statutes granting powers to municipalities are usually strictly con-
32 Behrens v. Commercial Waterway Dist. No. 1, 107 Wash. 155, 181 Pac. 892
(1919).
33 East Hoquiam Co. v. Hoquiam, 90 Wash. 210, 155 Pac. 754 (1916); Van Der
Creek v. Spokane, 78 Wash. 94, 138 Pac. 560 (1914).
34 Morse v. Wise, 37 Wn.2d 806, 226 P.2d 214 (1951).
35 153 Wash. 661, 280 Pac. 80 (1929).36 But when a city undertook and completed physical improvements of a street and
financed the project solely by funds to be raised by special assessment upon property
benefited, the city was not generally liable for a deficiency arising when part of the
assessment could not be collected because part of the property was not benefited and
further assessments could not be levied upon the property. Because the city was
not liable, it was held to have no power to assume the deficiency as a general indebted-
ness. Neither did the deficiency morally oblige the city to assume payment. Pratt v.
Seattle, 111 Wash. 104, 189 Pac. 565 (1920). In Pratt no attempt was made by the
city to change from a special assessment plan to general indebtedness prior to comple-
tion of the improvement. In Clise the work was abandoned and a special assessment
levied to pay the contractor in full for work actually done by him prior to completion of
the improvement out of the general fund.
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strued, and any doubts are usually resolved against the municipality." '
In Washington, however, powers vested in first-class cities are broadly
construed and statutes relating to the powers of first-class cities are
liberally interpreted. 8 As to special assessments, it is unnecessary to
distinguish between classes of cities. RCW 35.43.020 specifically pro-
vides that the general rule of strict construction of statutes in derogation
of the common law does not apply to statutes relating to municipal
local improvements. These statutes are to be "liberally construed for
the purpose of carrying out the objects for which intended." This
provision may well lead the court to allow some deviations which might
not be sustained in other circumstances."
In some states, the power of a municipality to levy special assess-
ments derives not only from statutes but also from home rule constitu-
tional provisions. A number of courts in home rule states have held this
power to be a local rather than a general matter, with the result that
municipal charter provisions are superior to state statutes in the event
of conflict.'0 In Washington, the home rule doctrine has been so weak-
ened that the legislature is supreme as to all matters, regardless of
whether they are matters of state-wide concern or local affairs. "'
Legislative supremacy is made explicitly clear in the case of special
assessments by RCW 35.43.030, which makes the local improvement
statutes applicable to all cities and towns, and which specifically super-
sedes inconsistent provisions in the charter of any city of the first
class.'" Each city and town is directed to enact ordinances necessary to
carry out the statutory provisions, and all proceedings are to be con-
ducted under such statutes and ordinances.,"
Municipal corporations cannot exercise powers beyond their limits,
except as such authority may be derived from a statute which expressly
or impliedly permits it." In general, exercise of extraterritorial powers
by municipal corporations has been a constant source of problems.
37 Pacific First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Pierce County, 27 Wn2d 347, 178 P2d 351
(1947).38 W inkenwerder v. YaJdma, 52 Wn.2d 617, 328 P2d 873 (1958).39 Buck v. Monroe, 85 Wash. 1, 147 Pac. 432 (1915).
40 See 2 Ax 'rT.u, op. cit. supra note 29, at 290.
'1 See Trautman, supra note 16, at 765-72.
'
2 Beach v. Bellingham, 80 Wash. 287, 141 Pac. 703 (1914). Statute which pre-
scribes publication of notice of proposed improvements prevails over charters of first
class cities.
See RCW 35.22.280 (first class cities) ; RCW 35.23.440(50) (second class cities';
RCW 3524.290(3) (third class cities).
43 Rosenthal v. Tacoma, 31 Wn.2d 32, 195 P.2d 102 (1948). However, an assessment
may be valid though the general ordinance is not passed before the city proceeds with
improvements. Great No. Ry. v. Leavenworth, 81 Wash. 511, 142 Pac. 1155 (1914).
14 Edmonds Land Co. v. Edmonds, 66 Wash. 201, 119 Pac. 192 (1911).
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However, RCW 35.43.030 eliminates many potential problems of this
kind by authorizing cities and towns to form local improvement districts
composed entirely, or in part, of unincorporated territory adjacent to
the corporate limits.
CREATION OF LocAL IMPROVEMENT DISTRICTS
RCW 35.43.040 designates the purposes for which the legislative
authority of any city or town may order a local improvement, and levy
a special assessment on property specially benefited. By its terms, the
statute is not restricted to the purposes listed, but applies "whenever
the public interest or convenience may require." This is of considerable
consequence, as it allows for the exercise of power to cope with prob-
lems unforeseen by the legislature at the time of enactment.45
Nevertheless, the great majority of local improvement districts are
created for one of the purposes stated in the statute. These purposes
include construction of streets and other public ways; auxiliary water
systems; recreational and playground facilities and structures; bridges,
culverts, trestles and approaches thereto; bulkheads and retaining
walls; dikes and embankments; sewers; escalators or moving sidewalks
(and defraying the expense of their operation and maintenance); parks
and playgrounds; sidewalks and curbing; street lighting systems (and
defraying the expense of furnishing electrical energy, maintenance and
operation);4" underground utilities transmission lines; water mains
and hydrants;47 and fences or coverings along or over open canals or
ditches.4"
Limitations placed upon the construction of trunk sewers and water
mains should be particularly noted. The territory which can be serviced
4 5 As an example, see 61 Ops. ATr'Y GE. 79 (1961), sustaining the authority of
cities and towns to create local improvement districts to finance construction of com-
munity fallout shelters.
46In Ankeny v. Spokane, 92 Wash. 549, 159 Pac. 806 (1916), the court sustained
special assessments for the cost of furnishing electrical energy. The fact that the cost
of operation exceeded the cost of the plant was not objectionable where the plant had
a local situs and did not extend over the city at large. Further, the fact that some posts
and lamps of the system were ornamental did not invalidate the assessment. RCW
35.43.040 specifically allows for placement of shade or ornamental trees and shrubbery
on an improvement.
47 In Smith v. Seattle, 25 Wash. 300, 65 Pac. 612 (1901), the court sustained a
special assessment for water mains against an attack that article 8, section 6, of the
Washington Constitution, which authorizes cities to become indebted in excess of the
limitation upon general municipal indebtedness for the purpose of supplying such cities
with water, artificial light and sewers, prohibited other payment than that made out of
a general fund.
48 RCW 35.43.045 grants cities right of entry upon irrigation, drainage and flood
control canals, and ditch rights of way, and the right to construct safeguards or to
require those maintaining the canal or ditch to construct safeguards, subject to reim-
bursement by the city.
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by the trunk lines is directed to be included, as nearly as possible, in
the original improvement district. This provision is not mandatory; it
allows the legislative authority of the city some discretion in determin-
ing whether the district shall conform strictly to topographical condi-
tions."' In distributing assessments in the case of trunk lines, property
lying between the termini of the improvement and back to the middle
of the blocks along the marginal lines of the area improved, is to be
assessed the reasonable cost of a local line and its appurtenances suited
to the requirements of the property. The remainder of the cost of the
improvement is to be distributed over and assessed against all of the
property within the boundaries of the district?' The abutting property
which is required to bear the extra expense has the immediate benefit
of the sewer and is not subsequently liable to assessment for lateral or
local sewers. As to the remaining property, the sewer is not of imme-
diate use and cannot be made useful without the additional expense of
construction of lateral or local sewers, which that property must subse-
quently bear. In the end, hopefully, the burden will be equalized."
The usual improvement district is corrected and continuous and
includes all of the property within a certain boundary that lies contig-
uous to the other properties involved.52 But the district may include
adjoining, vicinal or neighboring streets even though the improvement
made is not connected or continuous." In the latter case, the cost of
each continuous unit of the improvement is to be ascertained separately,
as near as may be, and the assessment rates computed on the basis of
the cost of each unit. The municipal legislative body may later, in its
discretion, eliminate from such a district any unit which is not connected
or continuous and proceed with the balance of the improvement.
Local improvement districts must be created by ordinance, pursuant
to a petition or resolution." The owners of property, aggregating a
majority of the lineal frontage upon the improvement and of the area
within the proposed district, may petition for any local improvement,
for which the assessment district does not extend beyond the termini of
49 See Brown v. Anacortes, 79 Wash. 33, 139 Pac. 652 (1914).
DO Towers v. Tacoma, 151 Wash. 577, 276 Pac. 888 (1929) ; In re Grandview, 118
Wash. 464,203 Pac. 988 (1922).
51 Triangle Traders v. Bremerton, 89 Wash. 214, 154 Pac. 193 (1916).
52 See McCormick, Special Assessments and Assessiment Districts (1960). This is
a mimeographed paper comprising a part of the outlines for a continuing legal education
series entitled "Municipal Law and Your Clients," available in the law library, Univer-
sity of Washington.
53 RCW 35.43.050.
5 RCW 35.43.070.
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
the improvement.55 This petition must set forth the nature and terri-
torial extent of the proposed improvement, the mode of payment, and
the proportion of the lineal frontage upon the improvement and of the
area within the proposed district which is owned by the signatory peti-
tioners. The petition is filed with the clerk or such other officer as the
city charter or ordinance may require."
Although a petition for a local improvement is not a jurisdictional
requirement and may be dispensed with by the legislature,57 and al-
though it is usually only one of two possible methods of initiating an
improvement, a petition is made mandatory by RCW 35.43.110 in
three instances. Any local improvement which includes a charge for
the cost of furnishing electrical energy to any system of street lighting,
or for the cost of operation and maintenance of escalators or moving
sidewalks, may be initiated only upon a petition signed by the owners
of two-thirds of the lineal frontage upon the proposed improvement
and two-thirds of the area within the limits of the proposed district.
An improvement of parkways must also be initiated by petition if
management of the parkways has been vested in a board of park
commissioners, unless the improvement is requested by the board of
park commissioners.
With the above three exceptions, an improvement may be initiated
by resolution.59 The resolution must be made by the legislative au-
thority of the city, declaring its intention to order the improvement,
setting forth the nature and territorial extent of the improvement, and
notifying all persons who may desire to object to the improvement to
appear at a designated time and present their objections. The resolu-
tion must be published in two consecutive issues of a newspaper, and
the first publication must appear at least fifteen days before the day
fixed for hearing. Notice of the hearing must also be given by mail to
the owners of all property to be specially benefited by the proposed
improvement, at least fifteen days before the day fixed for hearing.
55 The requirement that a majority of the property owners sign the petition is notjurisdictional if a municipal legislative body orders the improvement properly. Spokane
v. Ridpath, 74 Wash. 4, 132 Pac. 638 (1913).
56 RCW 35.43.120.5 7 Redding v. Spokane, 81 Wash. 263, 142 Pac. 664 (1914). RCW 35.43.100 provides,
in part, "the action and decision of the council as to all matters passed upon by it in
relation to any petition or resolution shall be final and conclusive."
58 As previously stated, a city may form a local improvement district which includes
territory outside the city limits. A 1963 statute RCW 35.43.075, provides that whenever
formation of a district, which lies entirely or in part outside of a city's corporate limits,
is initiated by petition, the municipal legislative authority may by a majority vote deny
the petition and refuse to form the district.
59 RCW 35.43.140.
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This notice must set forth the nature of the proposed improvement, its
estimated cost, and its estimated benefits to the particular lot." The
hearing may be held before the legislative authority of the city, or
before a committee which is subject to the legislative authority.
Upon filing of a petition or adoption of a resolution initiating a pro-
ceeding for formation of a local improvement district, the proper board
or officer designated by charter or ordinance to make preliminary esti-
mates and an assessment roll must prepare an estimate of the proposed
improvement's cost and certify this estimate to the legislative authority
of the city." If the proceedings are initiated by petition, the designated
board or officer must also determine the sufficiency of the petition and
whether the facts set forth in the petition are true. The estimate must
be accompanied by a diagram showing the property which will be
specially benefited by the proposed improvement and the estimated
cost to be borne by each lot. No diagram is required where the estimate
is on file in the office of the city engineer, together with a detailed copy
of the preliminary assessment roll and the plans and assessment maps
of the proposed improvement. 2
The cost esffmate is made to aid the legislative authority in deter-
mining whether to initiate the local improvement. The fact that actual
cost may eventually exceed the estimate does not later invalidate the
proceedings. In Vincent v. South Bend,3 the Washington court ap-
proved an assessment for $89,199.92 when the original estimate had
been only $9,500. It was found that the increased assessment repre-
sented actual bona fide cost, and the increased cost was occasioned by
a change of conditions.
There is nothing in the constitution requiring that notice of a
proposed improvement be given by resolution or otherwise. As a result,
the court has been somewhat liberal in allowing for deviations from the
statutory requirements as to notice and contents of a resolution.6"
Substantial compliance, rather than exact compliance, is the test." The
60 RCW 35.43.150.
61 The proper board officer is also to forward all papers and information in his pos-
session touching the proposed improvement, a description of the boundaries of the dis-
trict, a statement of what portion of the cost of the improvement should be borne by
the property within the proposed district, a statement in detail of the local improvement
assessments outstanding and unpaid against the property in the proposed district, and
a statement of the aggregate actual valuation of the real estate including twenty-five
percent of the actual valuation of the improvements in the proposed district according
to the valuation last placed upon it for the purposes of general taxation.
62 RCW 35A3.150.
0 83 Wash. 314, 145 Pac. 452 (1915). See also Inner-Circle Property Co. v. Seattle,
69 Wash. 508, 125 Pac. 970 (1912).64 Wilce v. Cheney, 93 Wash. 422, 161 Pac. 72 (1916).
65 Allen v. Bellingham, 77 Wash. 469, 137 Pac. 1016 (1914).
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purpose of the notice at this stage is not to accord a hearing upon the
validity of the assessment, which has not yet been determined or the
benefit to the property within the district, which has yet to be deter-
mined, but to accord a hearing upon the limits of the proposed district
and upon the question whether the district should be formed at all.6
Objections by property owners at this stage should be directed to those
questions. A failure to raise issues pertinent thereto, as to sufficiency of
the notice,6" or sufficiency of the city engineer's report,68 at this stage
will constitute a waiver. On the other hand, questions relating to
whether an improvement constitutes a general or special benefit, and
questions relating to the amount of benefit and assessment to each lot,
are not properly in issue at this stage. Such questions are to be raised
at the subsequent hearing on the assessment roll.6"
RCW 35.43.070 provides that, pursuant to a petition or resolution,
a local improvement may be ordered only by an ordinance which re-
ceives the affirmative vote of at least a majority of the members of a
municipal legislative body. In cities other than the first-class the
ordinance must receive the affirmative vote of at least two-thirds of the
members if, prior to its passage, written objections are filed with the
city clerk by or on behalf of owners of a majority of the lineal frontage
upon the improvement and of the area within the limits of the proposed
improvement district."0 The charters of first-class cities may prescribe
further limitations.
The ordinance ordering an improvement must establish a local im-
provement district by number, which district is to embrace as nearly
as practicable all the property specially benefited by the improvement."'
An ordinance may provide for more than one improvement, such as
widening of certain streets and changing of grades of certain streets,
where all relate to a unified subject. Each lot will bear its share of the
benefits resulting from the entire improvement. 2
Unless the ordinance provides otherwise, the improvement district is
to include all property between the termini of the improvement which
abuts or is adjacent, vicinal, or proximate to, the street or way to be
66 Chandler v. Puyallup, 70 Wash. 632, 127 Pac. 293 (1912).
67 Ibid.
68 Compare Great No. Ry. v. Leavenworth, 81 Wash. 511, 142 Pac. 1155 (1914),
with Buckley v. Tacoma, 9 Wash. 253, 37 Pac. 441 (1894).6 9 Matthews v. Ellensburg, 73 Wash. 272, 181 Pac. 839 (1913).
7o It is not necessary that two-thirds take direct action upon the objections, but only
that the ordinance be passed by that percentage. Buck v. Monroe, 85 Wash. 1, 147 Pac.
432 (1915).
71 RCW 35.43.080.
72 In re Third, Fourth & Fifth Ave., Seattle, 49 Wash. 109, 94 Pac. 1075 (1908).
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improved, to a distance of ninety feet back from the marginal lines of
the street or way, or to the center line of the blocks facing or abutting
on the street or way, whichever is greater. In the case of unplatted
property, the distance back is to be the same as that of immediately
adjacent platted property."
If special benefits resulting from the local improvement extend be-
yond the boundaries stated above, the municipal legislative authority
may create, by ordinance, an enlarged district, to include, as nearly as
practicable, all the property specially benefited by the improvement."'
The petition or resolution for an enlarged district and all related pro-
ceedings are to conform to the provisions governing local improvement
districts generally. However, the petition or resolution for an enlarged
district should describe the enlarged district as such,"' and state what
proportion of the amount to be charged to property specially benefited
is to be charged to the property which constitutes the enlargement.7
If special benefits conferred upon property by the proposed improve-
ment are not fairly reflected by the use of the termini and zone method,
the ordinance may provide that assessment shall be made against all
property in the district in accordance with the special benefits conferred
upon it, without regard to the termini and zone method. When this
73 Considerable litigation has been occasioned in defining terms. Where the western
terminum of a street improvement was fixed at the westerly line of an intersecting
street, the property on the northwest corner of the intersection did not "abut' upon the
improvement. Hensler v. Anacortes, 140 Wash. 184, 248 Pac. 406 (1926). "Bloce'
refers to a square included by four streets as located by the prevailing scheme of streets
in a locality. "Platted" property refers to that property included by regularly placed
intersecting streets where lands are capable of being platted. "Unplatted" property
refers to property not included by regularly placed intersecting streets. Sivyer & Sons
Co. v. Spokane, 77 Wash. 282, 137 Pac. 808 (1914). Property may be "immediately
adjacent' to unplatted property for purpose of assessment although it is separated from
unplatted property by a cross street. In re Tenth Ave. No. E., 125 Wash. 503, 217 Pac.
28 (1923). In assessing unplatted property by reference to adjacent platted property,
measurement back should begin from a common margin. Megary v. Woodland, 148
Wash. 560,269 Pac. 829 (1928).
If a municipal legislative authority desires to include property outside a normal
district, it is necessary for the legislative authority in the ordinance creating the district,
to so declare and describe the property included outside a normal district. Reitzie v.
Kirkland, 139 Wash. 466, 247 Pac. 735 (1926).
75 A statement of the proportion of the cost to be charged to the added property of
an enlarged district need not be included in an ordinance providing for the improvement,
but is a matter to be stated in the petition or resolution. State ex rel. Independent
Asphalt Paving Co. v. Gill, 87 Wash. 201, 151 Pac. 498 (1915).
7 It is necessary to distinguish between an enlarged district and a district for trunk
sewers and water mains, discussed in the text accompanying notes 51-53 supra. See
Brown v. Anacortes, 79 Wash. 33, 139 Pac. 652 (1914). Further requirements for an
ordinance ordering construction of trunk sewers, trunk water mains, dikes and auxiliary
water systems are prescribed in RCW 35.43.090. Such an ordinance must describe the
place of commencement and ending of the improvement and the route along which the
improvement is to be constructed; specify the structures or works necessary for form-
ing a part of the improvement; and adopt maps, plans, and specifications for the im-
provement.
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second method is adopted, the ordinance authorizing the improvement
must specifically provide that assessment shall be levied in accordance
with special benefits which property within the district will derive
from the improvement."
LIMITATIONS ON CREATION OF IMPROVEMENT DISTRICTS
Certain statutes limit and restrict the power of a city to create an
improvement district. Under RCW 35.43.160, no city may proceed
with a local improvement initiated by petition if it appears from pre-
liminary estimates and the assessment roll that the amount of estimated
cost, which is to be assessed against the property in the proposed
district, when added to all outstanding local improvement assessments
against the property in the proposed district (excluding certain spec-
fled assessments), exceeds the aggregate actual valuation of real estate
within the district (including twenty-five per cent of the actual valua-
tion of the improvement) according to the valuation last placed upon
it for the purposes of general taxation. However, this limitation may
be avoided if the property owners affected deposit with the city a sum
equal to the amount by which the estimated cost of the improvement
exceeds the prescribed limit." This limitation refers to the value of
property in the entire district, not to the value of each tract nor to the
amount which each tract may be charged."9 Further, the phrase "valua-
tion last placed upon it for the purposes of general taxation" in the
statute refers to the "actual valuation" of the real estate in the district,
rather than assessed value.80
Likewise, if a local improvement is initiated by resolution of the
municipal legislative authority, the city may not proceed if it appears
from prelminary estimates and the assessment roll that the city would
have been prohibited from proceeding had the improvement been
initiated by petition.8 There is an exception when, for reasons of pub-
lic health, the legislative authority by unanimous vote orders construc-
tion of sanitary sewers and necessary accessories for disposal of sewage;
77 Hargreaves v. Mulkiteo Water Dist., 37 Wn.2d 522, 224 P.2d 1061 (1950). This
decision may be modified by dictum in Hargreaves v. Mukilteo Water Dist., 43 Wn.2d
326, 261 P.2d 122 (1953) discussed in note 143 infra. See In re Schmitz, 44 Wn.2d 429,
268 P2d 436 (1954).7 8 The limitation does not apply to improvement of a disconnected unit included in
a local improvement district as permitted by RCW 35.43.050, discussed in text accom-
panying note 55 supra, but applies only to the local improvement district as a whole.
79 State ex rel. Hindley v. Superior Court, 82 Wash. 37, 143 Pac. 455 (1914) ; Hap-
good v. Seattle, 69 Wash. 497, 125 Pac. 965 (1912).
80 Cf., Schoen v. Seattle, 117 Wash. 303, 201 Pac. 293 (1921).
81 RCW 35.43.170.
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construction of any sanitary fill; or the filling of any street to the
established grade over tideflats or tidelands. The city may then assess
the cost to the property benefited without the limitations discussed
above.
RCW 35.43.180 provides that jurisdiction to proceed with an im-
provement initiated by resolution is divested by a protest filed with the
municipal legislative authority within thirty days after the date of
passage of an ordinance ordering the improvement. The protest must
be signed by owners of property within the proposed district who are
subject to sixty per cent or more of the total cost of the improvement,
as shown by preliminary estimates and the assessment roll of the pro-
posed district.8 2 This limitation does not apply to an improvement by
sanitary sewers if the municipal health officer with the municipal legis-
lative authority a report showing the necessity for such improvement;
if the municipal legislative body recites in the ordinance authorizing
the improvement that it is necessary for protection of the public health
and safety; and if the ordinance is passed by unanimous vote of all
members present. Divesture of jurisdiction by protest of property
owners does not estop the city from instituting a second proceeding for
the same improvement, and a change of conditions need not intervene
to render inapplicable the grounds of the original protest.8 3
One other statutory limitation relates to the method by which work
is to be done. Under RCW 35.43.190, all local improvements must
be made either by the city itself or by contract on competitive bids. The
board or officer charged with the duty of letting contracts for local
governments determines which means to use. If the contract method
is chosen, the city may reject any and all bids.
With respect to competitive bids, two additional points should be
mentioned. First, in Washington, a patented article may be specified
in the call for bids. Otherwise, a city would be deprived of the power
to procure the best article or material available simply because it is
procurable only from a limited source." Second, the fact that the city
includes a requirement in its call for bids which increases the cost of
82 Prior to 1957, authority to proceed could be divested by protests filed at any time
prior to the awarding of the contract for the improvement. See 24 WAsH. L. Rnv. 199
(1949). If all or part of the district lies outside the city, jurisdiction is divested by a
protest filed in the same manner and signed by owners of property which is within the
proposed district, but outside the boundaries of the city, and which is subject to sixty
per cent or more of that part of the total cost of the improvement allocable to property
within the proposed district but outside the boundaries of the city.83 Casco Co. v. Olympia, 124 Wash. 218, 213 Pac. 915 (1923).84 Smith v. Seattle, 192 Wash. 64, 72 P.2d 588 (1937) ; Great No. Ry. v. Leaven-
worth, 81 Wash. 511, 142 Pac. 1155 (1914).
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the work, as by prescribing a minimum wage which is higher than that
in private employment, does not invalidate the contract. However, a
property owner may be entitled to have the sum assessed against his
property reduced accordingly. 5
In Malette v. Spokane,"8 the Washington court sustained the levy
of an assessment for a street improvement for the full contract cost,
though the contract prescribed a higher rate of wages than the prevail-
ing rate. However, the court found that at the time of the contract no
statute or ordinance required competitive bidding. In view of the fact
that a statute now calls for competitive bidding when work is done for
a city by contract, it is unclear whether an assessment may now include
the cost resulting from a contract provision designed to effectuate some
separate public policy. For example, suppose an increase in cost re-
sults from a contract provision which restricts maximum hours to less
than the maximum prevailing in the community, requires union labor,
or requires the employment of local labor or use of locally produced
materials. May the increase in cost be assessed against property
owners? The decisions to date in Washington compel a negative an-
swer. However, since the city might do the work itself and impose
any resulting increase in costs upon property owners, it would seem
that the city should be able to do the same by contract. This rationale
is suggested by dictum in the Malette case.
Since the work might be done without letting a contract at all, it is plain
that the competitive principle would have no such drastic application as to
prevent the city from providing reasonable conditions under which the
work might be done, even though such conditions tended in some degree
to modify competition in some particular.87
In determining allowable assessments, the purposes and policies be-
hind contract provisions resulting in a restriction of competition, as
well as the policy behind the statutory provision for competition, should
be considered. Further, in Malette the court recognized that the city
does not act as agent of the owners whose property is assessed when it
provides for improvements; it acts as the "agent of the law" in letting
the contract and collecting the assessment. As something more than the
agent of the owners, the city should be able to effectuate other policies
in calling for bids. However, the court in Malette also noted that com-
petitive bidding statutes in other states have voided specifications tend-
85 Gerlach v. Spokane, 68 Wash. 589, 124 Pac. 121 (1912).
86 77 Wash. 205, 137 Pac. 496 (1913).
87 Id. at 233, 137 Pac. at 507.
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ing to increase cost and making bids less favorable to property owners.
The leading case in point is inconclusive, and further litigation may
be expected.
SPECIAL BENEFITS
No concept has created more problems of construction and inter-
pretation than the apparently simple concept of "special benefits." In
numerous cases, the Washington court has stated that property which
receives no benefit from a local improvement may not be assessed.8 An
opposite conclusion would result in a taking of property without com-
pensation, in violation of the ninth amendment to the Wash-
ington Constitution.
In some early cases, the Washington court ruled that property could
be assessed for no more than the amount of the benefit received from an
improvement. 9 Stated another way, no greater charge could be levied
upon property than a sum equal to the benefits received." In more re-
cent years, the court has stated that special assessments cannot sub-
stantially exceed the amount of the special benefits.9 It is now
recognized that exact equality of taxation is not always attainable,
and that excess of cost over special benefits may be ignored, unless the
excess is material.2
Further, property may not be assessed in an amount greater than
the property's proportional or relative benefit from a local improve-
ment. The court has stated:
If, for example, two or more persons severally own tracts of land abutting
upon a public improvement, each of which is equally benefited thereby,
the city can, by the process of forming an assessment district, confine an
assessment to pay the costs of the improvement to one or more of such
tracts to the exemption of the others, but it cannot lawfully cause the
entire cost to be assessed upon any number of such tracts less than the
whole, even though the tracts assessed be benefited in a sum equal to the
cost of the improvement. To do so ... would violate that general principle
which underlies all assessments, the principle which requires assessments
for the public benefit to be distributed with substantial equality over all
89 In re Jones, 52 Wn.2d 143, 324 P2d 259 (1959) ; Towers v. Tacoma, 151 Wash.
577,276 Pac. 888 (1929).SIn re Shilshole Ave., 94 Wash. 583, 162 Pac. 1010 (1917) ; In re Eighth Ave. No.
E., 77 Wash. 570,138 Pac. 10 (1914).90 Behrens v. Commercial Waterway Dist. No. 1, 107 Wash. 155, 181 Pac. 892
(1919).91 re Local Improvement No. 6097, 52 Wn2d 330, 324 P2d 1078 (1958) ; In re
Schmlitz, 44 Wn2d 429, 268 P.2d 436 (1954).92 Hargreaves v. Muldlteo Water Dist., 43 Wn.2d 326, 261 P.2d 122 (1953).
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property of like kind and similarly situated with reference to the subject
matter of the assessment. 93
The exclusion from a local improvement district of property which
received a benefit does not necessarily make an assessment invalid; 4
the fact of such exclusion may be considered, with other evidence, to
determine whether property in the district was assessed beyond its
special benefit.9"
The issue of special benefits is a judicial question, subject to review
by the courts." However, it is also recognized that the question of how
far the special benefits may physically extend beyond a local improve-
ment cannot be answered with any fixed rule.17 This question is ordi-
narily one of fact, 8 dependent upon the physical condition, locality,
and environment of the property involved, and the character of the
improvement.99 It is presumed that an improvement is a benefit; that
an assessment is no greater than the benefit; that an assessment is
equal or ratable to an assessment upon other property similarly sit-
uated; and that the assessment is fair.00
In terms of a formula, the amount of special benefit accruing to
property by reason of a local improvement is the difference between
the fair market value of the property immediately after the special
benefits have accrued and the fair market value of the property before
the benefits accrued. "Fair market value" is the amount of money
which a purchaser willing, but not obligated, to buy would pay an
owner willing, but not obligated, to sell, taking into consideration all
uses to which the property is adapted or might reasonably be applied. 1 1
Not only the actual present use of the property is considered, but also
any use to which the property is presently adaptable and any future
use to which the property is reasonably adaptable within a reasonable
93 re Eighth Ave. No. W., 77 Wash. 570, 576, 138 Pac. 10, 12 (1914). See 2
ANTITEAU, op. cit. supra note 31, at 324-25.
94 Moore v. Spokane, 88 Wash. 203, 152 Pac. 999 (1915).
95 Horton Investment Co. v. Seattle, 94 Wash. 556, 162 Pac. 989 (1917).
96 In re West Marginal Way, 112 Wash. 418, 192 Pac. 961 (1920) ; In re Shilshole
Ave., 94 Wash. 583, 162 Pac. 1010 (1917).9' Commissioners Commercial Waterway Dist. No. 2 v. Seattle Factory Sites Co.,
76 Wash. 181, 135 Pac. 1042 (1913).
98 Hargreaves v. Mulkilteo Water Dist., 43 Wn.2d 326, 261 P.2d 122 (1953) ; In re
Western Ave., 93 Wash. 472, 161 Pac. 381 (1916). But see, In. re Twentieth Ave.,
No. E., 95 Wash. 5, 12, 163 Pac. 12 (1917), "The question is so largely one of opinion
and not of fact it is generally held, where no other element intervenes, that the judg-
ment of the officers will not be disturbed." Is not a question of "opinion" a question of
fact in the sense used here?
99 In re Jones, 52 Wn.2d 143, 324 P.2d 259 (1958) ; In re West Marginal Way, 112
Wash. 418, 192 Pac. 961 (1920).
o10 Gerlach v. Spokane, 68 Wash. 589, 124 Pac. 121 (1912).
101 In re Local Improvement No. 6097, 52 Wn.2d 330, 324 P.2d 1078 (1958) ; In re
Schmitz, 44 Wn.2d 429, 268 P.2d 436 (1954).
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foreseeable time. 102 Property cannot be relieved from the burden of
an assessment simply because its owner has seen fit to devote it to a
use which presently may not be specifically benefited by the improve-
ment.103
However, an assessment may not be made for purely speculative
benefits."" In In re Marginal Way,"0 5 an assessment for a proposed
street was held invalid where the property assessed was located on an
island separated from the proposed street by a navigable waterway
subject to the control of the Federal Government and by privately
owned property abutting on the waterway. The street could be reached
from the island only by a bridge constructed over the waterway at great
expense, and no plans for a bridge existed at the time the assessment
was made. However, in Seattle v. Seattle & Mont. R.R.," the court
sustained a street improvement assessment against the railroad right of
way although the property was permanently adapted to railway uses
as an approach to a tunnel and the property would not actually be
benefited by the improvement so long as it was devoted to that use. In
the former case, the property involved could not be benefited without
construction of a bridge upon other property which was not controlled
by the assessed owner. In the latter case, the fact that the property
would not be benefited by the improvement, presently or in the future,
resulted from the owner's choice of use for its property.
This notion that particular use of land does not affect its liability to
assessment and that abutting property cannot be relieved from the
burden of assessment because its owner devotes it to a use which may
not be specially benefited is best illustrated by cases involving railroad
rights of way. The Washington court has held that a railroad right of
way is liable to special assessment for a local improvement such as
streets.' This view accords with the principles discussed above, since
the immediate effect of the improvement results from the nature of the
use determined by the owner, rather than from the nature of the
property or the nature of the improvement.
10 2 Newell v. Loeb, 77 Wash. 182, 137 Pac. 811 (1913). A city is allowed discretion
in excluding property which may be benefited in the future. Brown v. Anacortes, 79
Wash. 33, 139 Pac. 652 (1914).
o l re Jones, 52 Wn.2d 143, 324 P.2d 259 (1958).
204 In re Westlake Ave., 40 Wash. 144, 82 Pac. 279 (1905).
'0 112 Wash. 418, 192 Pac. 961 (1920).
100 50 Wash. 132, 96 Pac. 958 (1908).
107 Northern Pac. Ry v. Seattle, 46 Wash. 674, 91 Par. 244 (1907) ; Great No. Ry.
v. Seattle, 73 Wash. 576, 132 Pac. 234 (1913). But it has been held that a street railway
having a franchise to use a street for a limited time is not assessable for a street im-
provement Seattle v. Seattle Elec. Co., 48 Wash. 599, 94 Pac. 194 (1908) ; In re Third,
Fourth & Fifth Ave., Seattle, 49 Wash. 109, 94 Pac. 1075 (1908).
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Another factor considered in determining "special benefit" is the
existence of a like or similar improvement from which the property
derives a benefit. If a like or similar benefit does exist, the property
is usually not subject to assessment. Thus installation of a water main
on an adjoining street and installation of a fire hydrant at an adjoining
intersection did not result in a special benefit to property which was
already adequately supplied with water from another water main."'
Of course, the city may anticipate future needs and replace an old and
inadequate facility with a new, larger, and more effective one, assessing
property which is already served by an existing facility.'
Property can only be assessed once for a particular improvement. If
a city has been paid once it cannot levy another assessment for the same
improvement."' This rule does not prevent reassessment in some situa-
tions, nor does it mean that the power of assessment exercised once
cannot be exercised again. For example, the fact that a city has once
laid a sewer line and levied an assessment upon certain property does
not prevent the city from laying a newer sewer line and assessing the
property again. The power of assessment is a continuing power.11"
The special benefits requirement clearly precludes a levy in pro-
portion to the valuation of the property for general taxation." 2 Thus
the fact that the entire assessment for a local improvement exceeded
the valuation of all property in a district for general taxation did not
establish that the assessment exceeded special benefits conferred upon
the entire district or upon property assessed, there being no relation
between the benefits and general taxation valuation."' Likewise, the
benefit a particular piece of property may receive from an improvement
is not measured by the physical character or cost of that portion of the
improvement upon which the property abuts."' The questions are: to
what extent is the particular tract benefited by the entire improvement,
and is the particular tract assessed proportionally with the other prop-
erty included within the improvement district.
108 In re Jones, 52 Wn.2d 143, 324 P.2d 259 (1958).
10 In re Appeal of No. Yakima, 87 Wash. 279, 151 Pac. 795 (1915).
'110 In re Shilshole Ave., 94 Wash. 583, 162 Pac. 1010 (1917).
"' Knickerbocker v. Seattle, 69 Wash. 365, 124 Pac. 922 (1912).
112 Monk v. Ballard, 42 Wash. 35,84 Pac. 397 (1906).
118 East Hoquiam Co. v. Hoquiam, 90 Wash. 210, 155 Pac. 754 (1916). But see In
re Western Ave., 47 Wash. 42, 91 Pac. 548 (1907), in which the court stated that value
is an element which may be taken into consideration in determining benefits. The court
found, however, that the property had neither been assessed more than it was benefited
nor more than its proportionate share. Accord, In re Seattle, 50 Wash. 402, 97 Pac. 444
(1908).114 La Franchi v. Seattle, 78 Wash. 158, 138 Pac. 659 (1914).
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In re Aurora Ave.1 15 offers an excellent illustration of special benefit
principles. This case involved construction of a street and bridge and
assessment for part of the cost of the improvement of the residential
and business areas which were made more readily accessible to each
other. Physical factors considered were: distribution of population,
traffic congestion, improved access, topographical conditions, and rela-
tive distances from the business center. The fact that the improvement
was part of an arterial highway and the fact that the property had
been successively assessed for the opening of three previous traffic
avenues did not preclude a finding of special benefits.
ASSESSMIENT
Only that portion of the cost of a local improvement which is of
special benefit to property can be levied against it."' This rule has
been defined by statute t to include the following: (1) the cost of the
portion of the improvement within street intersections;"11 (2) the esti-
mated cost of all engineering and surveying necessary for the improve-
ment done under the supervision of a city engineer;119 (3) the estimated
cost of ascertaining ownership of the lots included in the assessment
district; (4) the estimated cost of advertising, mailing, and publishing
all necessary notices; 120 (5) the estimated cost of accounting, clerical
labor, and of books and blanks used by the city clerk and treasurer in
connection with the improvement; and (6) all cost of the acquisition of
rights of way, property, easements or other facilities or rights, whether
by eminent domain, purchase, gift, or in any other manner. 2'
Statutory provision is made for ascertaining the amount to be as-
sessed against each tract upon the basis of a so-called zone and termini
method. 2' The local improvement district is divided into subdivisions
or zones which parallel the margin of the improvement and encompass
215 180 Wash. 523,41 P.2d 143 (1935).
In re Local Improvement No. 6097, 52 Wn2d 330, 324 P.2d 1078 (1958).
21 RCW 35.44.020.
I's The city may also pay for the whole or part of this item out of its general fund.
Buck v. Town of Monroe, 85 Wash. 1, 147 Pac. 432 (1915).
119 The costs of the city attorney may also be included. In re Jackson St., 62 Wash.
432, 113 Pac. 1112 (1911).
220 Shryock v. Hannenen, 61 Wash. 296, 112 Pac. 377 (1910).
22 Where a district was dissolved because an improvement was impractical, the
property in the district could be charged with expenses incurred in determining whether
the improvement should be made. State ex Trel. O'Phelan v. Lundquist, 103 Wash.
339, 174 Pac. 440 (1918).
122 RCW 35.44.010 provides, in part, "The cost and expense shall be assessed upon
all the property in accordance with the special benefits conferred thereon in proportion
to area and distance back from the marginal line of the public way or area improved."
See RCW 35.43.080.
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a designated footage back from the improvement." 3 For example, the
first zone includes all the land lying between the street margin and
thirty feet; the second zone includes the land between thirty feet and
sixty feet, etc. A formula is prescribed for determining the rate of as-
sessment per square foot in each zone.' The total assessment ascer-
tained in this way against each lot is then entered upon the assessment
roll as the amount to be levied against each lot.'25 As has been pre-
viously discussed, special provision is made for calculation of assess-
ments in construction of trunk sewer and water mains,'26 and in creation
of an enlarged district. 7 Finally, it is provided that the termini and
zone method need not be used if it does not fairly reflect special
benefits.'
Presumably the latter provision allows a city to select any method
which will result in assessment according to special benefits. The court
has sustained assessments of specific sums against each lot abutting
upon a street, rather than a spreading out under a zone system;
12 9
assessments made partly upon a zone method and partly upon a frontage
basis;... and assessments made solely upon a frontage basis.' The
method of distributing cost, whether by zone system, by front foot, or
by area, does not itself affect the validity of the assessment. The critical
consideration always is whether the method of distributing cost properly
represents special benefits to the property assessed. An assessment for
watering a parking district made solely upon the basis of front footage
and disregarding the amount of parking to be maintained and the
situation of the lots, was invalid. 2 Apportionment of the cost of re-
moval of shade trees on the south side during improvement of a street
made ninety-five per cent to the south side and five per cent to the
north side was also invalid. 3 In the latter case, the court concluded
that all property should have been assessed equally.
Generally, the city has considerable freedom in its choice of method
for ascertaining the assessment to be levied against each tract. How-
123 RCW 35.44.030.
124 RCW 35.44.030. An alternative method of calculation is provided by RCW
35.44.045, for a local improvement district established for safeguarding open canals or
ditches.
125 RCW 35.44.050.
126 See text accompanying notes 49-51, supra.
127 See text accompanying notes 74-76 supra.
128 RCW 35.43.080.
129 Moore v. Spokane, 88 Wash. 203, 152 Pac. 999 (1915).
130 Gerlach v. Spokane, 68 Wash. 589, 124 Pac. 121 (1912).
131 Northern Pac. Ry. v. Seattle, 46 Wash. 674, 91 Pac. 244 (1907).
112 In re Rockwood Blvd., 170 Wash. 64, 15 P.2d 652 (1932).
133 In re California Ave., 30 Wn.2d 144, 190 P.2d 738 (1948).
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ever, as previously discussed, this freedom is qualified by the require-
ment that the ordinance establishing the district must so provide if a
means other than the zone and termini method is to be used.'""
By whatever method selected, the assessment for each lot must be
entered upon the assessment roll, which must be filed with the city
clerk. In preparation of the assessment roll, the municipal legislative
authority is not bound by the preliminary estimated amounts of assess-
ments." 5 Following preparation and filing of the roll, a date must be
fixed for a hearing before the municipal legislative authority or a
committee, and notice must be given of such hearing. 38
The notice must specify the time and place of hearing and must
direct all persons who may desire to file written objections to do so.'
Personal notice must be mailed to the owners whose names appear on
the assessment roll and, in addition, a general publication must be
made."'38 Irregularities in the notice are waived if the property owner
is advised of the hearing and has an opportunity to appear and make
his protests known. An objection that the notice did not exactly con-
form to the statute is unavailing if the objector is not prejudiced.'
The hearing on the assessment roll is the proper time for raising the
questions whether special benefits have been conferred and whether
th amounts of individual assessments are correct' ° If any objections
are not made within the time and manner prescribed, they are con-
clusively presumed to have been waived.' At the time fixed for hearing
objections to confirmation of the assessment roll, the municipal legisla-
tive authority may correct, revise, raise, lower, change, or modify the
roll. At the conclusion of the hearing it may confirm the roll by ordi-
nance, or set aside the roll and order the assessment to be made de
13* Hargreaves v. Mukilteo Water Dist., 37 Wn2d 522, 224 P.2d 1061 (1950) ; Har-
greaves v. Mukilteo Water Dist., 43 Wn2d 326, 261 P2d 122 (1953). In In re Schnz,
44 Wn.2d 429, 268 P.2d 436 (1954), evidence that an assessment was made on the basis
of "$5.00 a front foot" did not sustain a levy where the ordinance in question did not
provide for a method of assessment other than the zone and termini method. See note
142 infra.
185 RCW 35.44.060.
6 !RCW 35.44.070. Notice is specifically required by statute. In general, constitu-
tional due process is violated by failure to accord notice before an assessment becomes
a charge upon property. 14 McQuLmn, MuNIciPA. CowoRAi oNs § 38.98 (3rd ed.
1950). It is sometimes suggested, however, that the federal constitution is not violated
by failure to afford notice and hearing when a municipal legislative body itself imposes
individual assessments. See ANviTEsu & SEASONGOOD, CASES ON MuNIcIPAL COPORA-
TioNS, 572-73 (3rd ed. 1953).
137 RCW 35.44.080.
138 RCW 35.44.090.
239 In re Local Improvement Dist. Nos. 1-58 and 2-58, 57 Wn.2d 499, 358 P.2d 314
(1961) ; Redding v. Spokane, 81 Wash. 263, 142 Pac. 664 (1914).
140 Matthew v. Ellensburg, 73 Wash. 272, 131 Pac. 839 (1913).
241 RCW 35.44.110.
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novo." If an assessment roll is amended so as to raise any designated
assessments or include omitted property, a new time and place for hear-
ing must be fixed and a new notice of hearing on the roll given." 3
Before considering the effects of confirmation of the roll and the
means of rectifying any errors, the matters of estoppel and exemption
should be noted. An owner who has petitioned for an improvement is
estopped from contesting necessity for the improvement and, appar-
ently, from claiming there is no benefit at all.'" An owner may also
lose his right to contest by an express agreement waiving procedural
irregularities.'45 However, petitioners for an improvement are not
estopped from asserting that individual assessments are arbitrary or
excessive." ' Estoppel in the latter case would deny the statutory right
of owners to question the amount of assessment by proper objection
at the hearing on confirmation of the assessment roll." 7
A general exemption from taxation does not extend to special as-
sessments.' As a rule, all property covered by general terms of a
statute, and not specifically exempted, is subject to assessment for
local improvements. For example, the property of a commercial water-
way district was not exempt from assessment by a city where statutes
and ordinances did not expressly so provide, even though the com-
mercial waterway district might not have power to levy and collect
taxes to pay the assessment and might not have power to divert its
funds to purposes other than benefit of the district.'
Government-owned property has created a particular exemption prob-
142 RCW 35.44.100. By virtue of this provision, it may be possible for a city to
apportion benefits by a method other than the zone and termini method, though no such
statement is made in the original ordinance ordering an improvement. See Hargreaves
v. Mukilteo Water Dist. 43 Wn.2d 326,261 P.2d 122 (1953) (dictum).
243 RCW 35.44.120. Where notice of a special assessment for local improvements
limited assessment to property within 120 feet of the improved streets, as described in
the assessment roll, the city council could not, without notice, amend the roll to include
all property within 180 feet of the streets. Such an assessment was valid as to the 120
feet first described, but void as to the 60 feet added by amendment. State ex rel. Barber
Asphalt Paving Co. v. Seattle, 42 Wash. 370,85 Pac. 11 (1906).
1' Seattle v. Hill, 23 Wash. 92, 62 Pac. 446 (1900) ; Spokane v. Fonnell, 75 Wash.
417, 135 Pac. 211 (1913). Owners petitioning for a street of a certain width cannot
object to confirmation of the assessment on the ground that the width is unnecessary.
In re Jackson St., 62 Wash. 432, 113 Pac. 1112 (1911). However, the fact that a prop-
erty owner petitioned for an improvement and made affidavit that the property was a
public street did not estop the property owner from maintaining an action to cancel the
assessment when it was found that the property improved was not public property.
Allen v. Spokane, 108 Wash. 407, 184 Pac. 312 (1919); Yakima v. Snively, 140 Wash.
328, 248 Pac. 788 (1926).
15 Metropolitan Bldg. Co. v. Seattle, 92 Wash. 660, 159 Pac. 793 (1916).
146 Spokane v. Founell, 75 Wash. 417 135 Pan. 211 (1913).
'
47 In re Local Improvement No. 609k, 52 Wn.2d 330, 324 P.2d 1078 (1958).
11 Seanor v. Board of County Comm'rs, 13 Wash. 48,42 Pac. 552 (1895).
149 State ex reL. Renton v. Commercial Waterway Dist. No. 2, 152 Wash. 523, 278
Pac. 423 (1929).
[VOL. 40 : 100
ASSESSMENTS IN WASHINGTON
lem. Property owned by the United States is exempt from assessments
for local improvement 15 Nor, in the absence of express statutory
authority, can a municipality subject lands of the state to a special
assessment." Statutes now pr6vide that all lands held or owned by the
state and situated within the limits of any assessing district in the state
(including school lands, granted lands, escheated lands, tidelands, shore-
lands, and harbor areas lying between tide or shore lands and the outer
harbor line) may be asesssed for the cost of improvements specially
benefiting such lands 152 A state armory site," the school house and
playground property of a school district," ' and lands held by the state
department of highways 55 have been subject to assessment. Specific
statutory provisions also allow for assessment of city, county, and
metropolitan park district property, as well as leasehold rights and in-
terests of private individuals in harbor areas and tidelands.15
The Washington court has sustained validity of a condition in a dedi-
caton of land to a city that remaining land owned by the donor should
not be subject to assessment. 57 Also, a city's agreement exempting
property holders from assessment of their abutting property for the
cost of improving a street, for which they had dedicated a portion of
their lands, was sustained.5 Similarly, a contract for an easement for
a street in which the city agreed to reimburse an owner by repaying an
assessment against abutting property for opening, grading, or improv-
ing the street was sustained." Further, property owners who made
certain improvements which later became part of a local improvement
constructed by a city were entitled to credits for the amount expended
by them for such improvements. 60
150 Mullen Benevolent Corp. v. United States, 290 U.S. 89 (1933).
151 State v. Olympia, 171 Wash. 594, 18 P2d 848 (1933); Spokane v. Security
Soc'y, 46 Wash. 150, 89 Pac. 466 (1907).
182 RCW 79.44.100. For the purpose of levying assessments, the value of property
of the state, or of any county, city, school district, or other public corporation whose
property is not assessed for general taxes, is to be computed according to the standards
afforded by similarly situated property which is assessed for general taxes. RCW
35.43.130.1 53 Re Western Ave., 93 Wash. 472, 161 Pac. 381 (1916).
254 Spokane v. Fonnell, 75 Wash. 417, 135 Pac. 211 (1913).155 In re State's Appeal, 60 Wn.2d380, 374 P.2d 171 (1962).
156 RCW 35.44.130-.170. See North Am. Lumber Co. v. Blaine, 89 Wash. 366, 154
Pac. 446 (1916) (harbor areas and tidelands).
157 But -see, Vrana v. St. Louis, 164 Mo. 146, 64 S.W. 180 (1901).158 Giles v. Olympia, 115 Wash. 428, 197 Pac. 631 (1921).
159 Washington Water Power Co. v. Spokane, 89 Wash. 149, 154 Pac. 329 (1916).
For cases sustaining agreements not to assess in condemnation proceedings, see In re
Patterson, 98 Wash. 334, 167 Pac. 924 (1917) ; Richardson v. Seattle, 97 Wash. 371,
166 Pac. 639, (1917).
'do Johnson v. Tacoma, 41 Wash. 51, 82 Pac. 1092 (1905). Compare Northern Pac.
Ry. v. Raymond, 75 Wash. 322, 134 Pac. 1047 (1913).
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CONFIRMATION
If any property owner has any objections to confirmation of the as-
sessment roll, he must state them within the time and in the manner
prescribed or he is conclusively presumed to have waived them.' Once
an assessment roll has been confirmed, a statute provides that the
regularity, validity, and correctness of proceedings relating to the im-
provement and assessment, including action of the legislative authority
upon the assessment roll and confirmation, are conclusive in all things
upon all parties. The proceedings cannot be contested in any proceeding
by any person unless that person filed proper written objections to the
assessment roll and prosecutes an appeal. The only stated statutory
exceptions are:
No proceeding of any kind shall be commenced or prosecuted for the
purpose of defeating or contesting any assessment or the sale of any prop-
erty to pay an assessment or any certificate of delinquency issued therefor,
except that injunction proceedings may be brought to prevent the sale of
any real estate upon the ground (1) that the property about to be sold
does not appear upon the assessment roll or (2) that the assessment has
been paid.162
This statute does not preclude objections made in the proceedings
themselves or by a direct attack in reassessment proceedings. Its pur-
pose is to cut off such collateral proceedings as an action in equity to
cancel an assessment." 3 The Washington court has required strict com-
pliance with the statute and refused to allow parties to raise defenses to
the assessment after the hearing on the assessment roll.
To be successful, a collateral attack upon proceedings to confirm
the assessment roll must be directed at jurisdictional defects. Juris-
dictional defects have been found where the improvement was not for
the public benefit; 64 where the property improved was not public prop-
erty,62 and where there was a failure to give the required statutory
notice of proceedings to confirm the assessment role.6 In addition, a
1G1 RCW 35.44.110.
12 RCW 35.44.190.
163 Van Der Creek v. Spokane, 78 Wash. 94,138 Pac. 560 (1914).
164 Wiley v. Aberdeen, 123 Wash. 539, 212 Pac. 1049 (1923), involved construction
of a culvert on private property to keep open a non-navigable natural water course,
which had become obstructed by a private culvert and failure of private owners to
properly maintain the culvert.
165 Yakima v. Snively, 140 Wash. 328, 248 Pac. 788 (1926) ; Allen v. Spokane, 108
Wash. 407, 184 Pac. 312 (1919).
166 Pratt v. Water Dist. No. 79, 58 Wn.2d 420, 363 P.2d 816 (1961). This case con-
cerned a water district rather than a city, but the statute involved was basically the
same as the statute regarding cities and towns.
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few cases hold that proceedings to confirm an assessment role which
includes property not subject to assessment are void to that extent and
subject to collateral attack. 6' The exact limits of the latter exception
are not clear. The fact that property is not benefited by an improvement
is not a jurisdictional defect, 6 ' though certainly an assessment roll
which includes unbenefited property can be said to include property
which is not subject to assessment. It may be expected that this excep-
tion will be strictly construed in the future. Certainly the tenor of the
great majority of the opinions has been one of strict construction of
"jurisdiction," and preclusion of attacks other than those prescribed
by statute.6 9
The following objections have been held not jurisdictional; they must
be raised at the hearing on the assessment roll: that sufficient notice
was not given of an intention to make an improvement; that specifica-
tions for the improvement were insufficient; 70 that a city should not
have accepted work improperly performed by a contractor;. 7 ' that
landowners had dedicated land to the city for street purposes under a
contract providing that their abutting land should be free from assess-
ment for improvement of the street;.. 2 that a city should have credited
certain money before assessing property owners instead of wrongfully
diverting it to other purposes;"'7 that an assessment exceeded charter
limitations; 7 that an assessment was greater than the actual cost of
the improvement; that the assessment included items not proper, such
as the cost of repairs of streets for five years; that the amount imposed
upon an individual tract exceeded the benefits conferred. 5 Any one
of these objections to confirmation of the assessment roll, timely raised
and supported, would have been successful.
167 Seattle & Puget Sound Packing Co. v. Seattle, 51 Wash. 49, 97 Pac. 1093 (1908),
(property which had, in prior condemnation proceedings, been adjudged to have been
damaged in excess of benefits); North Am. Lumber Co. v. Blaine, 89 Wash. 366, 154
Pac. 446 (1916) (private leasehold interests in harbor areas which have since been
made subject to assessment by RCW 35.44.150); Northern Pac. Ry. v. Walla Walla,
114 Wash. 153, 194 Pac. 962 (1921) ; Reitzie v. Kirkland, 139 Wash. 466, 247 Pac. 735
(1926) (property beyond the statutory limits of the district).
168 State ex rel. Renton v. Commercial Waterway Dist. No. 2, 152 Wash. 523, 278
Pac. 423 (1929).
169 But see Wade v. Tacoma, 131 Wash. 245, 230 Pac. 99 (1924), where property
owners successfully enjoined a city from paying a contractor any sum exceeding the
amount due on the contract, even though the property owners could not directly have
had their assessments cancelled or set aside.170 Brewster v. Hamilton, 138 Wash. 652, 244 Pac. 973 (1926).
17' O'Neill v. Auburn, 76 Wash. 207, 135 Pac. 1000 (1913).
'
72 Lee v. Olympia, 122 Wash. 616, 211 Pac. 883 (1922).
' Sanderson v. Seattle, 95 Wash. 582, 164 Pac. 217 (1917).174 Longview v. Longview Co., 21 Wn2d 248, 150 P.2d 395 (1944).
175 Alexander v. Tacoma, 35 Wash. 366, 77 Pac. 686 (1904).
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APPEALS
The decision of a municipal legislative authority is final and con-
clusive upon any objections made in the manner and within the time
prescribed, subject to a limited review by the superior court. Just as it
is critical that the parties abide by the designated procedures in making
their objections known at the hearing or confirmation at the local level,
the same also is true in taking appeals to the superior court.'
Appeal is made by filing written notice of appeal with the city clerk
and the clerk of the superior court of the county in which the city is
situated within ten days after the ordinance confirming the assessment
roll becomes effective. 7 At the time of filing the notice of appeal, the
appellant must also file a $200 bond, conditioned to prosecute the appeal
without delay and to pay all costs to the city by reason of the appeal.'
Within ten days after filing notice, the appellant must file with the
clerk of the superior court a transcript consisting of the assessment roll
and his objections, together with the ordinance confirming the assess-
ment roll and the record of the municipal legislative authority referring
to the assessment, and give notice of such filing to the city.' The
superior court is directed by statute to hear the appeal without a jury
and give preference to appeal over all other civil causes except proceed-
ings relating to eminent domain in cities and actions of forcible entry
and detainerY °
Review is limited. It has been said that power to determine the
necessity for an improvement, the character of the improvement, and
the materials out of which the improvement shall be constructed are
legislative questions wholly within the discretion of the city.' More-
over, broad discretion, conclusive in the absence of fraud or arbitrary
action, is recognized in the city regarding establishment of the bound-
aries of improvement districts and apportionment of the costs between
the general funds of the city and special assessments upon property
owners. Courts have been very reluctant to reverse on such issues. 2
176 State ex. rel. Frese v. Normandy Park, 64 Wn2d 423, 392 P2d 207 (1964) ;
Colville v. Goetter, 82 Wash. 305, 144 Pac. 30 (1914) ; In re Local Improvement Sewer
Dist. No. 1, 84 Wash. 565, 147 Pac. 199 (1915).
177 RCW 35.44200-210.
178 RCW 35.44.220.
'17 RCW 35.44230-.240.
180 RCW 35.44250.
181 Knickerbocker v. Seattle, 69 Wash. 365, 124 Pac. 922 (1912) ; In re Shilshole
Ave., 94 Wash. 583, 162 Pac. 1010 (1917).
182In re Aurora Ave., 180 Wash. 523, 41 P.2d 143 (1935) ; In re Grandview, 118
Wash. 464, 203 Pac. 988 (1922); Brown v. Anacortes, 79 Wash. 33, 139 Pac. 652(1914) ; It re Westlake Ave., 40 Wash. 144, 82 Pac. 279 (1905).
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Review of the questions whether and to what extent certain property
is benefited by a particular improvement has been most troublesome.
At one time a determination by the city that certain property was bene-
fited by an improvement was not subject to review in the absence of
fraud or arbitrary action."8 3 It was presumed that the city's findings
as to benefit and the consequent assessment were fair; the burden to
establish fraud or arbitrary action was on the property owner.1 ' More
recently, the Washington Supreme Court has been more willing to
review the question of benefits and to allow for a greater review by the
superior courts. While a presumption of correctness continues, a greater
review of the evidence has been undertaken. In In re Sckmit, 185 the
Washington court, after a detailed review of the evidence, reversed
both a city and the trial judge, concluding that the amount of assessment
upon the appellants' property substantially exceeded the value of the
special benefits accruing to appellants' property by reason of the im-
provement. Four years later, in In re Local Improvement No. 6097,86
the court again reviewed evidence in detail, this time affirming a su-
perior court reversal of a city on the question of benefits.
A 1957 statutory amendment may affect the scope of review in the
future. Prior to that time, RCW 35.44.250 provided that, "The judg-
ment of the court shall confirm, correct, modify, or annul the assess-
ment insofar as it affects the property of the appellant." In 1957 this
statute was amended to read:
The judgment of the court shall confirm, unless the court shall find from
the evidence that such assessment is founded upon a fundamentally wrong
basis and/or the decision of the council or other legislative body thereon
was arbitrary or capricious; in which event the judgment of the court
shall correct, change, modify, or annul the assessment insofar as it affects
the property of the appellant.
It has been said that this amendment was an attempt to take some
of the "sting" out of the result in In re Schmitz.1 7 Whether the at-
tempt will be successful remains to be seen. That it may not is
suggested by the fact that in both In re Schmitz and In re Local
Improvement No. 6097 the court observed that the assessment was, or
might have been, levied on a fundamentally wrong basis. The statute as
188 In re Appeal of No. Yakima, 87 Wash. 279, 151 Pac. 795 (1915).
184 Gerlach v. Spokane, 68 Wash. 589, 124 Pac. 121 (1912). See Spokane v. Fonnell,
75 Wash. 417, 135 Pac. 211 (1913) (the presumption was overcome).
185 44 Wn.2d 429, 268 P.2d 436 (1954).
186 52 Wn2d 330, 324 P2d 1078 (1958).
187 Gay, Local Government Law, Washington Legislation-1957, 32 WASH. L. REV.
196, 199 (1957).
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amended, allows the court to correct, change, modify, or annul the
assessment in such an instance. What may be overlooked is that at an
earlier date the court was not as willing to review evidence in such
detail in order to determine whether an assessment was levied on a
fundamentally wrong basis. Did the legislature intend for the court to
revert to its prior practice in that regard? If so, to what extent and in
what manner will the court implement that intent? To date, these
questions have not been answered.
The judgment of the superior court is of course an appealable order.
It is critical to note that an appeal to the supreme court must be per-
fected within fifteen days after entry of a judgment in the superior
court;... the general rule of allowing thirty days for an appeal from
a final judgment does not apply. 9 The record and opening brief of an
appellant are to be filed with the supreme court within sixty days after
filing of notice of appeal, subject to extension by order of the superior
court or by stipulation of the parties. Review by the supreme court ac-
cords with the principles discussed above, with the usual deference to
the determination made by the trial court.
REASSESSMENT
If assessments are invalid for want of form, or for insufficiency, in-
formality, irregularity, or nonconformance with provisions of law, char-
ter, or ordinance, a statute authorizes the local legislative authority to
reassess the assessments and enforce their collection, in accordance
with the provisions of law and ordinance existing at the time the reas-
sessment is made. 9' The fact that a contract has been let or that an
improvement has been completed in whole or part does not prevent
reassessment. Any municipal officer's noncompliance with the law
governing a city as to petition, notice, resolution to improve, estimate,
survey, diagram, manner of letting the contract, or execution of the
work or any other matter connected with the improvement and the first
assessment does not invalidate a reassessment.'
Any reassessment must be made in accordance with statutory pro-
visions, since a reassessment for any purpose without legislative author-
ity is invalid. 2 As indicated above, failure to comply with statutory
188 RCW 35.44.260.
189 WAsH. RULES oN APP. 33(1) (a) ; In re West Barton St. Sewer, 163 Wash. 645,
1 P.2d 858 (1931).
190 RCW 35.44.280.
191 RCW 35.44.300.
192 See Franklin Sa. Bank v. Moran, 19 Wash. 200, 52 Pac. 858 (1898), in which a
reassessment to pay for the construction of a dike was held invalid where a statute
authorized reassessment only for drains and ditches.
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requirements in making the original assessment does not preclude a re-
assessment. Likewise, the fact that a court has decided the original
assessment roll invalid does not bar reassessment by res judicata.93
As a practical matter, the most common reason for reassessment is
likely to be a judicial determination that the city has in some way failed
to abide by a statutory requirement in the original assessment. The
statutes do not authorize a reassessment simply because some property
owners have defaulted in their payments. When property owners have
defaulted, the city must proceed with collection of the delinquent
assessments, rather than reassess against those property owners who
have already paid.'"
A reassessment must be made upon property which has been or will
be specially benefiting by the improvement. This allows for the inclu-
sion of property not in the original improvement district." 5 Of course,
if the city enlarges the district upon reassessment, it must give the
added property owners an opportunity to be heard.' Upon reassess-
ment, the question of benefits and apportionment is in no way controlled
by the original assessment'
A reassessment must be for an amount which does not exceed actual
cost of the improvement and accrued interest. 9 In apportioning cost
to specially benefited property, any sums paid on the original assess-
ment must be credited to the property for which they were paid."'
Any ordinance providing for a reassessment must be enacted within
ten years after an original assessment has been determined invalid or
insufficient."°' All the statutory provisions relating to filing of assess-
ment rolls, time and place for hearing, notice of hearing, hearing upon
the roll, confirmation of the roll, and proceedings on appeal apply to a
'93 Allen v. Bellinghan, 77 Wash. 469, 137 Pac. 1016 (1914). However, a judgment
vacating an assessment as to certain tracts upon a finding that they were assessed in
excess of benefits conferred is res judicata and bars reassessment of the same tracts for
the same improvement in the same or greater amounts. East Hoquiam Co. v. Hoquiam,
90 Wash. 210, 155 Pac. 754 (1916). Where an assessment was adjudged invalid because
certain property had been damaged and was therefore nonassessable, such property
could not be subjected to a reassessment, although it may in fact have been benefited.
Hapgood v. Seattle, 69 Wash. 497, 125 Pac. 965 (1912).
104 State ex reL Johnson v. Dayton, 200 Wash. 91, 93 P.2d 909 (1939). See also, 24
Ors. Arr'y GEN. 294 (1924).
'95 RCW 35.44.290.106 Bremerton v. Triangle Traders, 89 Wash. 214, 154 Pac. 193 (1916) ; Reitzie v.
Kirkland, 139 Wash. 466, 247 Pac. 735 (1926).
197 Inner-Circle Property Co. v. Seattle, 69 Wash. 508, 125 Pac. 970 (1912). As
discussed in note 193 supra, a judgment as to special benefits received by any particular
tracts will be res judicata as to those tracts.
'9s RCW 35.44.310.
199 RCW 35.44.320.
200 RCW 35.44.340.
19651
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reassessment just as to an original assessment.20' Since a reassess-
ment is a de novo proceeding, the fact that persons failed to object
to an original assessment does not preclude them from objecting to a
reassessment. 2 ' However, the property owner who fails to object to a
reassessment upon proper notice may not later dispute its validity.0 '
CONCLUSIONS
Procedure for establishment of local improvement districts and de-
termination of special assessments is well defined. Although there are
potential traps for the unwary, careful reading and compliance with the
detailed statutory provisions provide adequate protection for property
owners. Ample provision is made for participation and protests by
those to be affected. On the other hand, the procedure enables the cities
to proceed with necessary improvements in an expeditious manner.
Additional and separate problems arise from financing of improve-
ments, payment by owners, and collection of assessments by the cities.
It is anticipated that these problems will be examined in a later issue
of the Washington Law Review.
201 RCW 35.44.350. Comparable provisions allow for assessments upon property
improperly omitted from the original assessment roll, RCW 35.44.360-380, and for
supplemental assessments when the amount originally assessed is not equal to the cost
of the local improvement or that portion to be paid by assessment of the property
benefited, RCW 35.44.390-400.20 2 Van Der Creek v. Spokane, 78 Wash. 94, 138 Pac. 560 (1914).
203 McNamee v. Tacoma, 24 Wash. 591, 64 Pac. 791 (1901).
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